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Abstract - Under waivers to the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, the federal government
required states to identify schools where targeted subgroups of students have the lowest
achievement and to implement reforms in these “Focus Schools.” In this study, we examine the
Focus School reforms in the state of Kentucky. The reforms in this state are uniquely interesting
for several reasons. One is that the state developed unusually explicit guidance for Focus Schools
centered on a comprehensive school-planning process. Second, the state identified Focus Schools
using a “super subgroup” measure that combined traditionally low-performing subgroups into an
umbrella group. This design feature may have catalyzed broader whole-school reforms and
attenuated the incentives to target reform efforts narrowly. Using regression discontinuity
designs, we find that these reforms led to substantial improvements in school performance,
raising math achievement by 17 percent and reading achievement by 9 percent.
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1. Introduction
In the United States, the last 15 years have marked an era of exceptional federal activism
focused on the performance of public schools, particularly with regard to historically
underserved students. This period began with the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), which
brought test-based school accountability to scale in the U.S. and highlighted stark and enduring
achievement gaps by race, ethnicity, and income. NCLB also set a 2014 deadline for all students
to achieve proficiency. The broad expectation was that NCLB would be redesigned and
reauthorized in advance of that deadline. However, because partisan gridlock in Congress stalled
this reauthorization, U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan articulated, in 2011, conditions
under which states could receive NCLB waivers. These waivers reflected the Obama
administration’s vision for the reauthorization of NCLB but proved controversial, generating
pushback from both parties in Congress, as well as teachers’ unions and state education agencies
(Klein 2015). The goals of these waivers included increased flexibility in school-accountability
systems, a focus on college and career-ready standards and new systems for evaluating the
effectiveness of teachers and principals.
However, a defining feature of these waiver-driven reforms was also the emphasis on
“differentiated accountability” for schools. In particular, states that received waivers were
required to categorize the 10 percent of their schools with the largest achievement gaps as
“Focus Schools” and the 5 percent of schools with persistently low achievement as “Priority
Schools.” Both reforms were effectively unfunded but otherwise differed in interesting ways.
Like schools that had recently received federal School Improvement Grants, Priority Schools
were required to implement a school-turnaround model consistent with federal guidance.1 In
sharp contrast, Focus Schools were given substantial flexibility as to how they identified and
implemented reforms intended to reduce their achievement gaps. Understanding the effects of
these federally catalyzed reforms is particularly salient as these approaches to school
1

See Dee (2012) for an overview of federal turnaround of these models (i.e., transformation, turnaround, restart, and
closure) and their features (e.g. hiring a new principal, replacing a large portion of teaching staff, implementing
instructional reforms, and social-emotional supports) and their effects.
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accountability may continue under the recent reauthorization of NCLB known as the “Every
Student Succeeds Act” (ESSA) (Klein 2016).
In this study, we examine the implementation and impact of Focus School reforms in the
state of Kentucky.2 Kentucky is a particularly interesting setting in which to examine the effects
of these reforms for two broad reasons. One is that, during this period, Kentucky established a
reputation for their early adoption and high-fidelity implementation of new reforms (e.g., the
Common Core State Standards, Race to the Top). Therefore, they are likely to constitute a strong
test of whether these federally motivated reforms can drive meaningful improvements in schoollevel outcomes. Interestingly, Kentucky chose a relatively prescriptive approach to its Focus
Schools that included an emphasis on school-improvement planning and teacher professional
development. Second, along with a few other states, Kentucky implemented an interesting and
fairly unique design feature. They identified Focus Schools using the performance of a “super
subgroup” of traditionally low-performing subgroups (i.e., free/reduced price lunch, students
with disabilities, black, Hispanic, American Indian, and limited English proficient) for two
reasons. Firstly, this approach increased the number of smaller rural schools held accountable
under the new system.3 Secondly, this inclusive design ensured that small subgroups that might
not meet size requirements within a school would receive attention. This may be relevant given
that accountability systems that target narrow subgroups can induce schools to engage in
strategic behaviors like targeting efforts among specific populations of students (Figlio and Loeb
2011). Kentucky’s unique omnibus approach to identifying Focus Schools could sharply
attenuate the incentives for such strategic behaviors.
To credibly identify the causal effects of these reforms, we rely on regression
discontinuity (RD) designs based on the discontinuous assignment of schools to Focus School
status. Our RD results indicate that Kentucky’s Focus School reforms led to substantial gains in

2

We do not examine the effects of the Priority School reforms because the small number of Priority Schools (and
their overlap with earlier SIG reforms) implies attenuated statistical power.
3
In Kentucky, subgroups with at least 25 students count for accountability purposes. By combining traditionally lowperforming subgroups into an umbrella group, more schools receive an accountability rating.
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students’ math and reading proficiency rates (i.e., a 17 percent improvement in mathematics
proficiency and 9 percent improvement in reading proficiency). Furthermore, we find evidence
that these gains occurred throughout the distributions of math and reading achievement (i.e., not
just proximate to the proficiency threshold). We also find that these results are robust to a variety
of checks for internal validity including possible confounds related to the non-random, postreform sorting of students. We also present evidence suggesting that comprehensive school
planning and effective teacher professional development were important mediators of the Focus
School reform’s impact. We organize our study as follows. In section 2, we discuss the policy
context in Kentucky and provide a brief review of the relevant literature and theoretical
considerations. In section 3, we characterize the treatment contrast for Focus Schools. In section
4, we describe the data and the construction of our analytic samples. In section 5, we present our
RD estimation strategy and related robustness checks. We discuss our results in section 6 and
conclude in section 7.

2. Background and Prior Literature
The Focus School reforms examined in this study were implemented under the recent
federal waivers to the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act. NCLB was the influential and
controversial federal legislation that brought test-based school accountability to scale in the
United States and required all students to be proficient by 2014. Anticipating that states would
not be able to meet this proficiency requirement, the U.S. Department of Education began
offering waivers in 2011 to states that developed more flexible systems of school accountability
consistent with new guidelines. Among other things, these waivers mandated that states identify
and target reforms in schools that contributed the most to achievement gaps (i.e., “Focus
Schools”).4 Learning from these early Focus School reforms is highly relevant as they will
continue nationwide under NCLB’s recent reauthorization as the “Every Student Succeeds Act”
(ESSA). This current policy emphasis on a more targeted “differentiated” approach to school
4

We describe the federal NCLB waivers and Focus School reforms in more detail in Section 3.
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accountability represents the most recent iteration of a quarter-century of school accountability
policies. In general, these school accountability reforms articulated consequential sanctions and
supports (e.g., labeling, staff or school reconstitution, technical assistance) for schools that failed
to meet test-based performance goals.
The implied theoretical motivations for school accountability situate the chronic
underperformance of some schools with respect to information asymmetries and the collectiveaction challenges of organizational effectiveness. More specifically, the logic of these reforms is
that the public-sector agents in districts and schools may lack knowledge of their performance
(e.g., the existence and character of achievement gaps) or a willingness to focus on them instead
of other goals without more oversight from key stakeholders (e.g., parents and tax payers). Also,
the external incentives created by school accountability may also encourage schools to overcome
the collection-action challenges that can inhibit school effectiveness (e.g., school culture,
cooperative management, and instructional practices).
The empirical literature on school accountability generally suggests that these reforms
generated meaningful, though not transformational, improvements in student learning as
measured by low-stakes tests unrelated to the accountability incentives (National Research
Council, 2011, Figlio and Loeb 2011). This quasi-experimental literature includes studies of the
state-level reforms that preceded NCLB (Carnoy & Loeb, 2002; Hanushek & Raymond, 2005) as
well as studies of NCLB’s impact (Dee and Jacob 2011; Wong, Steiner, and Cook 2013). There
is also some evidence that schools and teachers may respond strategically in certain ways to the
presence of accountability incentives (Figlio and Loeb 2011). For example, Dee, Jacob, and
Schwartz (2012) find evidence that NCLB led to a modest reallocation of instructional time from
non-tested to tested subjects.
The Focus School reforms are also closely related to “whole-school” or comprehensive
school reforms (CSR) that call for the simultaneous and multi-faceted overhaul of an entire
school to refocus efforts to raise student-achievement (Borman et al., 2003). Between 1998 and
2005, the U.S. Department of Education disseminated $1.8 billion in grants for low-performing
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schools to participate in a CSR program. The federal CSR program articulated eleven broad
reform strategies required of participating schools. These included a focus on strong academic
content, articulating measurable goals, professional development, attention to the allocation of
resources, and outside technical assistance. Studies of the federal CSR initiative found little
evidence that they were successful in raising student achievement (U.S. Department of
Education, 2010; Gross, Booker, and Goldhaber 2009). Other evidence suggests that the schoollevel implementation of the federal CSR model was uneven in ways that mattered for sustaining
school improvement (Desimone 2002, Bifulco, Duncombe, and Yinger 2005, U.S. Department
of Education 2010). A meta-analysis by Borman et al. 2003 concludes that, in contrast to the
federal CSR effort, other specific CSR models (i.e., Direct Instruction, Success for All, and the
School Development Program) appear to have had meaningful impacts on student achievement,
particularly when implemented over several years.
These prior studies have several implications for the Focus School reforms studied here.
First, the prior evidence suggests some optimism that the latest incarnation of consequential
school accountability (i.e., targeting particular schools for improvement and supports) may be
effective in improving student achievement. Second, this literature also implies that attention to
the potential unintended consequences of such reforms is warranted. Third, the evidence from
successful CSR models suggests that Focus School reforms may be more effective to the extent
that they employ similar strategies such as formative assessment and data-driven instruction
(e.g., Success for All), school-wide planning and community engagement (e.g., the School
Development Program), and differentiated instruction (e.g., Direct Instruction). Finally, the
experience with the federal CSR program implies that the efficacy of Focus School reforms will
turn critically on the quality of the implementation at the state and local level. In the next section,
we turn to such evidence by characterizing Kentucky’s Focus School reforms as well as the
evidence on their implementation.
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3. Focus Schools in Kentucky
For the past 25 years, Kentucky has situated itself as a consistently early and enthusiastic
adopter of education reforms. For example, in 1990, the Kentucky Education Reform Act
(KERA) reformed the state’s education finance system, increased school accountability, and
introduced new educational standards and assessments. More recently, the state was the first to
adopt the Common Core State Standards (CCSS), doing so before the standards were complete
(Governor’s Task Force, 2011; Ujifusa, 2013). Kentucky was also viewed as a leader in
supporting the classroom implementation of the CCSS (e.g., Gewertz 2011). The state received
$17 million in the federal Race to the Top (RttT) competition and was among the first group of
states to apply for a federal waiver from NCLB. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Education
later invited Kentucky to apply for a “fast-track” waiver renewal of its NCLB waiver (Klein,
2015). Kentucky’s recent record of adopting and implementing leading K-12 policy reforms
suggests that it is a particularly propitious setting in which to study the effects of the school
reforms required under NCLB waivers.
3.1 NCLB Waivers
The waiver process had its genesis in both the design of NCLB and federal politics.
NCLB required that all students be deemed proficient in their state accountability system by
2014. The widespread anticipation that this ambitious goal would not be met motivated extensive
discussion of reauthorizing NCLB with updated requirements. However, the legislative failure to
advance any such legislation created the opportunity for the U.S. Department of Education to
offer states waivers from these requirements. In 2011, under Secretary Arne Duncan, states were
encouraged to apply for such waivers by outlining new accountability systems consistent with
the reform principles favored by the Obama administration. Central among these was the
encouragement to adopt “differentiated recognition, accountability, and support systems.” States
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receiving waivers were required to identify schools that were persistently lowest performing
schools (i.e., Priority Schools) and have them implement federally prescribed reforms.5
They were also required to designate as “Focus Schools” those that had the lowest
performance for designated subgroups or the largest performance gaps between subgroups. A
minimum of 10 percent of Title I schools in a state needed to be identified as Focus Schools.
States were required to field interventions in these schools though the federal waivers allowed
flexibility in contrast to the prescriptive requirements associated with Priority Schools. While
Priority Schools were required to implement one of the federal School Improvement Grant (SIG)
turnaround strategies, Focus Schools were asked to implement interventions that were
“consistent with” federal turnaround principles or any other “research-based” interventions to
meet the needs of students at the school (U.S. Department of Education 2012). We describe
Kentucky’s Focus School initiative in more detail below.
Kentucky submitted its application for an NCLB waiver in November of 2011. The U.S.
Department of Education approved the waiver in February of 2012 and implementation was set
to begin in the 2012-13 school year. However, a vendor delay slowed implementation of the
identification of schools and, as a result, the Kentucky Department of Education (KDE) notified
schools of their Focus School status in late October of 2012. Schools then had 90 days to develop
their Comprehensive School Improvement Plan (CSIP), a central element of the waiver and
Focus School reforms that we describe in more detail below. Given the delayed timeline,
schools did not have a full school year to implement reforms. Therefore, in this paper we focus
our analyses on outcomes from the 2013-14 school year, the first full year in which Focus
Schools implemented their chosen reforms.
We later describe in detail Kentucky’s procedure for identifying Focus Schools. However,
one distinctive feature merits special attention. As a predominantly rural state, Kentucky has
many small schools that often do not enroll enough students to meet the minimum subgroup
5

The number of Priority Schools is required to be equal to 5% of the number of Title I schools in the state. We do
not study these reforms in Kentucky because there are two few of such schools to support reasonable statistical
power.
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size.6 In order to have appropriate representation of schools serving targeted students among
designated Focus Schools, Kentucky introduced a “super-subgroup” measure, combining
unduplicated counts of students from traditionally low-performing subgroups (i.e. free/reduced
price lunch, students with disabilities, black, Hispanic, American Indian, and limited English
proficient) into an umbrella group. To mitigate any concerns that the larger group would mask
low individual subgroup achievement, Kentucky also used a second method for Focus School
identification that considered subgroup performance of traditionally low-performing subgroups
separately. A seemingly unintended but possibly beneficial feature of the “super-subgroup”
measure is that it attenuates any incentives school may have to focus on a particular subgroup of
students, possibly at the expense of others (i.e., “triage” behavior).
3.2 Focus School Reforms in Kentucky
Kentucky’s leading transition to the CCSS also provided the state with motivation to
redesign its school accountability system. In 2009, bipartisan legislation (Senate Bill 1) called for
an overhaul of previous reform efforts and a unified focus on college and career-ready standards
and assessments to be implemented in the 2011-12 school year. In its 2011 waiver application,
the state noted the strong alignment between these in-progress reforms, the corresponding
changes to their accountability system, and the principles behind NCLB waivers. Kentucky’s
newly designed accountability system focused on holding all schools accountable for student
achievement.7 In particular, the “central tenet” of Kentucky’s accountability system (U.S.
Department of Education 2011) focused on the design, revision, and monitoring of
Comprehensive School Improvement Plans (CSIP). A school committee that includes
representation from parents, students, and the community would begin the state-designed CSIP
process with a school-needs assessment linked to data, explicit standards, and indicators for
school improvement. The CSIP guides these committees to identify and prioritize their school’s

6

The minimum subgroup size in Kentucky is 25. A subgroup that meets the minimum subgroup threshold has their
achievement factored into a school’s accountability rating and reports their achievement publicly.
7
As such, all schools - including those ineligible for Title I support - were eligible for Focus School status if they
met the selection criteria.
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needs. They then identify strategies and activities designed to address the high-priority needs, a
person responsible for that task, a corresponding timeline, and a funding source.
The CSIP process is critical for understanding the treatment contrast created by Focus
School eligibility. In particular, as articulated in Kentucky’s original waiver application,
designation as a Focus School implied several additional CSIP requirements related to gap issues
and the school’s plan to address them. For example, districts were required to assist their Focus
Schools with their needs assessment, using guidance from the Commissioner’s Raising
Achievement/Closing Gaps Council (CRACGC). The CSIPs for Focus Schools also had a unique
requirement to identify specific strategies for closing gaps in student achievement and graduation
rates. The state also required the Focus School CSIPs to discuss curricular alignment that would
ensure a rigorous instructional program aligned to student needs and the Common Core. Other
unique requirements of Focus School CSIPs were the provision of time for collaborating on the
use of data to inform instructional strategies, aligned professional development, and strategies for
school safety and discipline. All schools were required to post their CSIPs on their web sites so
that they would be available for public inspection.
The KDE also established units dedicated to supporting school capacity to implement these
plans. The Office of Next Generation Schools and Districts orchestrated technical assistance to
schools statewide. However, a specialized KDE unit, District 180, was specifically tasked with
providing Focus and Priority Schools technical assistance in developing and implementing their
CSIPs (e.g., identifying research-based interventions). The state also sought to publicize school
improvement efforts. The KDE encouraged Focus Schools to submit potential best practices,
which they graded according to a standard rubric and posted these vetted practices in an online
database for other schools to access. The KDE gave schools with assessed best practices a $500
reward and publicized their name on the department website and in media press releases. In
terms of monitoring Focus School improvement, the KDE viewed local districts as the first level
of oversight while KDE staff provided additional oversight when schools were not on-track to
exit Focus School status (Kentucky Department of Education 2011). Focus Schools that failed to
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exit Focus School status after several years could also be redesignated as Priority Schools and
compelled to undertake more explicit reforms.
Kentucky’s original waiver application explicitly indicates that the CSIP requirements
unique to Focus Schools are the defining characteristic of their intended intervention. However,
apart from the CSIP process, there were at least two other candidate mediators that may
characterize the Focus School intervention. One is simply the stigma that might be associated
with being labeled a Focus School and that could spur school improvement independent of the
CSIP process. Another is that Kentucky’s waiver reforms provided Focus Schools with enhanced
financial flexibility to combine and redirect multiple Title I funding streams. It also expanded
eligibility for the Title I school-wide program (SWP) to all Focus Schools. As a Title I SWP,
Focus Schools were also eligible to receive additional support from the state to implement the
reforms articulated in their CSIPs.8
After the first full year of Focus School implementation (i.e., in August of 2014),
Kentucky submitted its successful application for an extension to its NCLB waiver. This
application indicates that a key treatment contrast between Focus Schools and other schools was
attenuated by the 2014-15 school year. That is, the application describes a reinvigorated
emphasis on supporting and monitoring CSIPs through a new review rubric that applies to all
Focus and Title I schools. We examined this rubric and found that it contained the CSIP
elements that had been required only of Focus Schools through the 2013-14 school year. Because
of this extension of the key intervention elements to all Title I schools (i.e., the overwhelming
majority of our analytical sample), we focus our analysis on outcomes from the 2013-14 school
year (i.e., the first full year of Focus School implementation) in which the treatment contrast was
crisp.9 Nonetheless, we also report the results from the 2014-15 school year in an appendix.10

8

As a practical matter, this funding flexibility has attenuated empirical relevance for the treatment contrast we
study. Specifically, among the 187 Focus Schools in our analytical sample, only 42 obtained SWP status as a result
of the waiver reforms.
9
The treatment contrast may have also been attenuated in subsequent years by a growing awareness of the threat of
Focus School status among schools above but close to the eligibility threshold.
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3.3 Focus School Implementation
The activities unique to Focus Schools featured school-improvement planning with an
emphasis on state-approved strategies (e.g., gap-closing programs and activities, instructional
reforms, and professional development) coupled with local and state monitoring as well as
financial flexibility. However, the actual implementation of these reforms may have differed
from the stated policy intent. While we lack comprehensive information on the Focus School
implementation in Kentucky, we look to several sources of information. These include federal
monitoring reports of Kentucky’s waiver activities, evidence from media accounts, our own
interviews with KDE officials responsible for supporting Focus Schools, our own review of
school improvement plans, and results from a statewide teacher survey.
A federal review of Kentucky’s waiver reforms occurred during a week in late August 2013
(i.e., just before the first full year of Focus School implementation). Federal officials reviewed
state documents and conducted interviews with several state officials before issuing annual
monitoring reports summarizing implementation and listing next steps when implementation did
not comply with the approved waiver. This report characterized Kentucky’s Focus School
implementation as “Not Meeting Expectations.” Specifically, the federal review called for the
state to increase their oversight and monitoring in concordance with their approved waiver (U.S.
Department of Education 2013). Kentucky’s successful 2014 application for a waiver extension
indicated that the U.S. Department of Education was satisfied the state addressed the areas of
concern from the monitoring report (Delisle, 2014).
We now turn to implementation evidence about the experience of Focus Schools from
local media coverage that includes interviews with school principals as well as the authors’
personal communications with KDE officials. Media coverage of Focus Schools in Fayette
County Public Schools (FCPS), the second largest school district in the state, indicates that Focus

10

These results in Appendix Table 1 suggest similarly positive effects of the Focus School status. However, the
point estimates are somewhat smaller and statistically insignificant. This pattern is consistent with the relevance of
the school-planning process as a mediator and the clear dampening of the treatment contrast described here.
However, we acknowledge the possibility that the intervention’s effects faded.
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School principals were required to present their school improvement plans to the school board.
District officials also assigned principals to work with a mentor, usually a retired principal, to
help implement the plans (Spears, 2015). Other coverage indicates that staff and the local
community were aware of the label and highly motivated to exit Focus School status. A local
media outlet covered the celebration of one high school that exited Focus School status: the
principal invited local media to cover the outdoor carnival-like event with activities for students
and teachers (Foley, 2015).
Personal communication with state officials on technical assistance and state monitoring
revealed that Focus Schools may not have received the high level of state support and oversight
articulated in the approved waiver (i.e., a finding also suggested by the federal monitoring report
from 2013). A KDE official disclosed to us that the state office charged with providing technical
assistance primarily served Priority Schools although services were accessible to Focus Schools.
We also learned that the staff at the KDE technical assistance office, District 180, interacted with
Focus Schools mainly by reviewing their CSIP. Unfortunately, District 180 staff did not maintain
records of their interactions with schools so it is unknown how many Focus Schools sought out
technical assistance nor the intensity of such. Moreover, few schools were subject to the more
extensive management audits that examined their activities and only one of these schools was a
Focus School.11 Although the state articulated an exhaustive protocol for the monitoring and
oversight of Focus Schools, the onus appears to have been on local districts to provide oversight
and guidance to treatment schools.
With this in mind, we examined school improvement plans to gain additional insight into
the character of the Focus School activities. We conducted a review of CSIPs for all schools in
the two largest school districts in the state, Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) and Fayette
County Public Schools (FCPS) that had plans readily available for review. We obtained CSIPs
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A KDE official also revealed that four schools ultimately underwent a management audit: one Focus school, one
Priority, and two additional schools with no accountability classification. For confidentiality reasons, we suppress
here the names of the KDE officials with whom we spoke.
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for all 107 JCPS and 47 FCPS schools in our sample for the 2013-14 school year.12 In our
review, we coded whether schools mentioned the major whole-school reforms recommended by
the state (e.g. extended learning time, teacher collaboration, professional development, datadriven instructional practices, and computer-aided instruction for low-performing students) and
find nearly universal compliance. However, schools were somewhat less likely to follow KDE
guidance in listing specific strategies for students with disabilities and/or non-English proficient
students (i.e., 61 percent). Our review of CSIP plans suggests that Focus Schools followed the
recommended state guidelines in developing their plans but provides little insight into whether
Focus Schools carried out their plans differently from those of non-treatment schools.
To this end, we turn to our final source of information from state surveys of teachers that
provides information on the experience of teachers rather than intended activities. The Teaching,
Empowering, Leading and Learning (TELL) Kentucky survey, administered in 2015, covered
salient topics on teacher working conditions including professional development, use of time,
instructional practices and support. The high average response rate (i.e., 92 percent) allows us to
examine whether teachers at Focus Schools report differences compared to those at nontreatment sites.13 Our Appendix Table 2 presents results from auxiliary RD regressions that
examine the effects of Focus School reforms on teachers’ perceptions of the quality of their
professional development (i.e., 10 distinct items and an overall composite). The point estimates
are uniformly positive, indicating that Focus School reforms led to broad improvements in the
quality of teacher professional development. The gains were particularly large (and statistically
significant) for teacher reports of whether their professional development included collaboration
and follow-up as well as whether it supported teachers in meeting student needs and promoting
learning.

12

Nearly half of JCPS middle and elementary schools were classified as Focus Schools (n=51). Fayette County
Public Schools have 17 Focus Schools in the sample. Together these two large districts host 68 Focus Schools or 36
percent of the Focus Schools in the sample.
13
We run auxiliary regressions to check for continuity of response rate and likelihood of any responses at the Focus
School assignment threshold and find no discontinuous jumps.
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In summary, the available evidence suggests that Focus Schools followed state guidance in
developing key operational details of their plans for school improvement. This activity is
reflected in teacher reports of improved teacher professional development at treatment schools.
The available media accounts also provide evidence that Focus School status captured the
attention of key stakeholders in the school improvement process. However, our interviews with
KDE officials suggested that the quality of state technical assistance and oversight is probably
best characterized as uncertain, particularly for our key outcome year (i.e., 2013-14).

4. Data and Sample Construction
We use cross-sections of school-level data with information on relevant subgroup
performance to examine the effect of the Focus School reform. Our data come from the annual
School Report Cards (SRC) published by the Kentucky Department of Education (KDE) over
several years. Our core outcomes are school-level measures of student test performance (e.g.,
percent proficient) by subgroup for the first full year of implementation (i.e., 2013-14). The SRC
also provides school-year data on the baseline assignment variables, Focus School status, and
other characteristics of schools, students and teachers. We also add school level data from the
Common Core of Data (CCD) on eligibility for and participation in federal Title I programs as
well as school directory information.
To construct the analytic sample, we include all schools in the risk pool for Focus School
status following the multiple rating assignment procedure. KDE provided 1,296 schools with a
differentiated accountability rating but we restrict the analytic sample in several important ways.
First, we exclude all 230 high schools because the end-of-course exams administered to these
students are not part of the state’s K-PREP testing system and separate analyses of high schools
are uninformative due to insufficient power. Second, we exclude 12 schools for one of three
reasons. The state identified nine of these schools as Priority Schools, implying ineligibility for
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Focus School status.14 We eliminate a single school because it did not meet the minimum student
group size to receive an assignment score.15 We also exclude two schools, which are part of a
PK-12 laboratory school situated on Eastern Kentucky University’s campus and require an
application for admission and charge tuition and fees. These edits resulted in a sample of 1,054
elementary and middle schools eligible for Focus School status.
Our sample is limited further by the exclusion of schools that have a valid assignment
variable but lack outcome data (i.e., test scores). Schools lack valid outcome data for one of two
reasons: school closure (n=27) or a grade reconfiguration such that the school no longer has
assessment results for the content level in which they received their original accountability
assignment (n=11). The exclusion of these 38 schools, which are located in small, rural districts,
reduces our sample further to 1,016 schools. Though these school changes are uncommon, we
find that they are concentrated among schools that were not designated as Focus Schools
(Appendix Figure 1). In fact, parametric RD estimates indicate that Focus School status
significantly reduced the probability of school-closure or reconstitution.16 Given the policy
debates around school closures, we view this as a substantively interesting finding (i.e., that an
energetic school-reform effort reduced the risk of a school being closed or reorganized).
However, in terms of evaluating the impact of Focus School reforms, these school changes,
though uncommon, may still constitute an internal-validity threat. Specifically, it is reasonable to
suppose that the schools that were closed or reorganized would have had comparatively poor
student outcomes if they had remained structured as they were. The systematic removal of such
struggling schools from the “control” side of the threshold that determined Focus School status
would then imply an upward bias in the estimated effects of these reforms. To address this
14

Kentucky identified 41 Priority Schools, 32 were high schools and nine middle schools. No elementary schools
were given Priority School status.
15
Anchorage Independent Public School is a K-8 school that is the sole school in the school district. The elementary
level classification was “High performing” while the state classified the middle school as a reward school. The
school did not have enough students in the gap group (or any of the individual subgroups) to present results. They
are the only school in KY that did not report information on gap group students at baseline.
16
We look both parametrically and non-parametrically for discontinuities at the assignment threshold for school
closure and grade reconstitution (both combined and separately). Our estimates confirm the statistical significance of
the discontinuities.
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concern, we identified the 18 small, rural school districts in which these school changes occurred
and eliminated all of the schools from these districts. This implied an exclusion of only 96
additional schools and reduced our final analytical sample to 920 schools.17 We focus on this
sample because of the clear integrity of the intent-to-treat population. However, we also note that
the fuller sample implies similar results suggesting that the external-validity caveats associated
with deleting these rural districts is not empirically consequential.18
In Table 1, we present descriptive statistics for this sample of 920 schools. Our core outcome
measures are the reading and math proficiency rates for the targeted umbrella “Gap Group” in
2013-14. In the publicly reported data, there is some modest suppression of these test score
results because of privacy concerns related to small cell sizes and the restrictions of the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). For our core test-score outcomes, only two
schools suppress their reading performance and four schools suppress their math performance.
Given how uncommon this suppression is (and the procedure for being allowed to do so), there is
little reason to suspect that it constitutes an internal-validity threat. Nonetheless, for every testscore outcome and specification (e.g., fuzzy and frontier RD) we report, we examined auxiliary
RD models that examined whether test-score suppression was balanced around the threshold. We
consistently found no evidence that test suppression changed significantly at the Focus School
threshold.
Kentucky’s SRC contain a rich set of covariates at the school level including content level,
(e.g. elementary, middle, high), total enrollment, student-teacher ratio, attendance and teacher
qualifications (Table 1). We supplement SRC data with additional measures from the Common
Core of Data including school urbanicity, Title I eligibility and Title I program type. We utilize
performance level assessment data from the Kentucky Performance Rating of Education
17

We adopted a parallel sample-construction protocol for the 2014-15 results we report in an appendix. This results
in a sample of 852 schools.
18
We show these results in Appendix Table 1. The first column shows results from our preferred sample (i.e.,
including only schools in districts without school closures or grade configuration changes). The second column
includes all schools with available results and, finally, the third column uses the Last Observation Carry Forward
(LOCF) imputation procedure. LOCF carries forward the last available proficiency rate for schools in the sample
with missing outcomes.
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Progress (K-PREP). These K-PREP assessment data are aligned with the Common Core State
Standards (CCSS) and available in mathematics and reading for grades 3-8 aggregated at the
school level for different subgroups. Performance data reports the percent of students achieving a
particular performance level: novice, apprentice, proficient and distinguished. While we focus on
the proficiency rates of “gap group” students (i.e. free/reduced price lunch, special education,
black, Hispanic, American Indian, and limited English proficient), we also explore treatment
heterogeneity at different performance thresholds and for the available subgroups. The K-PREP
assessment program was first fielded in the 2011-12 school year (i.e., the first state to administer
CCSS-aligned assessments). The identification of Focus Schools under Kentucky’s NCLB
waiver, which we describe in more detail below, is from this first year of K-PREP assessments.
Table 1 lists baseline characteristics for the 920 schools in the analytic sample that are
eligible for Focus School status. About one-fifth of the analytic sample, 187 schools, have Focus
School status. The Student Gap Group (SGG) score, based on 2011-12 K-PREP results, is one of
the assignment variables that determines Focus School status. We center the SGG score so that
schools with a value less than zero are eligible for Focus School status (i.e., 9.2 percent of the
sample).
Student characteristics include the percent of male students, percent of students qualifying
for free/reduced price lunch, racial/ethnic composition (e.g. white, black, Hispanic etc.) and
attendance rates. Kentucky schools largely enroll white students; the average school enrolls 82.7
percent white students though some regions enroll relatively small shares of whites and larger
proportions of blacks and Hispanics. Asians, American Indian/Alaskan Natives, and other groups
comprise a small proportion of Kentucky students. Due to the overall low enrollment numbers of
blacks and Hispanics and their concentration in a minority of schools, we do not have statistical
power to detect treatment effects for these subgroups and instead focus on the more inclusive gap
group. Students in Kentucky are relatively socioeconomically disadvantaged; the average school
has 63 percent of students eligible for free or reduced priced meals. Kentucky is a predominantly
rural state; half of the schools in the analytic sample are located in rural areas while less than one
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in five are located in urban areas. Although information on limited English proficiency (LEP)
and special education program participation is not available at baseline, they are available for the
post-treatment period and we use these data to conduct additional robustness checks.
Almost 80 percent of schools administer a Title I school wide program (SWP) at baseline,
a designation that prior to the ESEA waiver required schools to enroll at least 40 percent
free/reduced price lunch eligible students.19 Teacher characteristics include teachers’ mean years
of experience and the proportion with an advanced degree. While the average school has a
teaching staff with over 10 years of experience and just over half have advanced degrees, this
varies dramatically across schools. Average teacher experience ranges from 2 to 20 years and the
proportion of teaching staff with an advanced degree ranges from 10 to 90 percent.

5. Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design & Estimation
5.1. Assignment mechanisms
In this study, we largely focus on one of the two assignment criteria for Focus School
classification. The Student Gap Group (SGG) score is a weighted average of the percent of
proficient or above for “gap group” students across five subject areas in the 2011-12 K-PREP
assessments.20 Gap group students with membership in multiple subgroups are counted once in
the formula. Therefore, the group is based on the unduplicated count of students with
membership in any gap group (i.e. free/reduced price lunch, special education, black, Hispanic,
American Indian and/or limited English proficient). The threshold for Focus School status is
specific to each school level; schools with an SGG score in the bottom 10 percent of elementary,
middle or high schools are eligible for Focus School classification.
19

As noted earlier, 42 of the 187 Focus Schools in our sample obtained SWP status as part of the reforms, implying
that funding flexibility is part of the treatment contrast. Visual inspection of SWP status suggests a modest increase
at the eligibility threshold. However, auxiliary RD regressions that condition on the control variables indicate that
SWP status appears continuous through the Focus School threshold, suggesting it is not a salient part of the contrast
we study.
20
The five subject areas consist of reading, math, science, social studies, and writing/language mechanics. We focus
on reading and math because these are the only subjects in which students are tested annually in grades 3 through 8.
Students are tested in science in grades 4 and 7; social studies in grades 5 and 8; writing in grades 5, 6 and 8; and
language mechanics in grades 4 and 6.
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A second assignment criteria, the Third Standard Deviation (TSD) method, targets schools
with low subgroup performance relative to the statewide proficiency rate in any of the five
designated subjects. Any school with a minimum of 25 tested students in a given subgroup
would receive the Focus School designation if a subgroup-by-subject performance met the TSD
assignment criteria. For each level (i.e. elementary, middle and high school), the mean and
standard deviation of the statewide proficiency rate for all students was calculated in each of the
five subjects. Any school with a subgroup performing three standard deviations below the
statewide mean in a subject was eligible for Focus School status. This implies that, in theory, a
school could have as many as 30 TSD assignment variables (i.e., scores for 6 subgroups by 5
subjects).21 However, we define each school’s relevant TSD assignment variable as its lowest
subgroup-by-subject performance measure with respect to the relevant TSD threshold. As a
practical matter, the lowest TSD score among Focus-eligible schools was often in reading (76
percent) and the lowest-performing subgroup was, typically, special education (86 percent).
In sum, the state intended to designate a school as a Focus School if one of two conditions
were met. One is when gap group students performed below the 10-percent threshold for its
school level. Alternatively, a school would receive Focus status if, for any designated subject, a
targeted subgroup of 25 or more students within the school performed 3 standard deviations
below the state mean for the group. Because schools receive a rating along both dimensions, they
can fall into one of four quadrants that relate to their intent-to-treat status as illustrated in Figure
1. The upper right quadrant contains schools with SGG scores and their lowest TSD scores above
the assignment thresholds (n=720). These schools are ineligible for Focus School status (i.e., the
intent to treat is zero). The 200 schools spread across the remaining three quadrants qualify for
Focus School status based on their SGG score; their TSD score or both SGG and TSD scores
below the assignment threshold (i.e., the intent to treat is 1).
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This was not true in practice because the 3 standard-deviation threshold was below zero in two subjects (i.e., math
and writing). So, the maximum number of TSD assignment variables per school was 18 (i.e., 6 subgroups by 3
subjects).
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Our analytical approach, described in detail below, relies almost exclusively on the Focus
School assignment generated by SGG scores (rather than the TSD scores) as a source of
identifying variation. Our motivation for this emphasis is that the Focus School uptake generated
by SGG scores is particularly interesting because it is likely to motivate a broader and more
impactful reform than those motivated more narrowly by the low performance of just one
subgroup and subject. In our concluding remarks, we underscore that the gap-group policy
design we leverage (and the particular treatment contrast it created) is among several important
issues that influence the external validity of our findings. However, for completeness, we also
show results based on the TSD assignment variable we constructed (Appendix Table 3) where
we find similar school-level improvements in students’ reading performance, the subject most
targeted by this narrow assignment rule.
Our preferred RD designs leverage the credibly quasi-random assignment to Focus reforms
generated by the proximity of a school’s SGG score to the arbitrary threshold that determined
treatment. Specifically, we adopt two approaches articulated in the recent literature on
multivariate RD designs (e.g., Reardon & Robinson & 2012; Papay et al. 2011; Wong et al.
2013). One is a straightforward “fuzzy” RD design based on the full sample of n=920 schools. In
this sample, all schools with SGG scores below the threshold are subject to Focus School
reforms. However, as we show below, a fraction of schools with SGG scores above the threshold
are Focus Schools because they are assigned under the TSD rule (hence, the “fuzziness” in the
first stage assignment). This approach is akin to comparing the schools on either side of the
entire vertical axis in Figure 1. Our second approach is a “frontier” RD design based on
eliminating schools that were already treatment-eligible under the TSD rule (i.e., the schools in
the bottom two quadrants of Figure 1). This approach gives us a virtually “sharp” first-stage
relationship focusing on schools that were only eligible because their SGG score fell below the
threshold.22 We report both results because each has potentially compelling properties. The fuzzy
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The frontier RD is not a fully sharp design in this application because two ineligible schools mistakenly received
Focus School status.
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RD approach leverages the statistical power of the full sample. However, the frontier RD
approach does not rely on the assumption that potential outcomes are continuous along a longer
frontier that may be characterized by heterogeneous treatments (Wong et al. 2013). We also
examined a “binding score” RD approach in which both assignment variables were converted to
a single variable (i.e., the minimum of both). We find that this approach generates results similar
to those we report but believe its implicit assumption (namely, that of homogeneous treatments
along the entire response surface) is untenable given the more targeted treatment we expect in
schools eligible only under the TSD rule.
5.2. Estimation
In this study, we report reduced-form estimates of the effect of Focus School eligibility
(i.e., the intent to treat or ITT) based on specifications with the following general form:
!! = ! ! !"" !"#$%! < 0 + ! !"" !"#$%! + !! + !!

(1)

In this specification, !(!"" !"#$%! < 0) is an indicator for whether the centered SGG score for
school i is below the threshold that implies Focus School eligibility. The variable, !! , represents
school-level baseline covariates and !! is the error term. The parameter of interest, !, represents
the level change in student proficiency at the Focus School assignment threshold conditional on a
flexible function of the assignment variable, ! !"" !"#$%! . Our preferred models impose a
linear relationship between the SGG score and outcomes but allow for different slopes on either
side of the threshold. We chose our preferred functional form using both graphical evidence and
Akaike’s Information Criteria (Schochet et al. 2010). However, we also estimate outcomes using
higher order polynomials. Furthermore, we also present results based on local linear regressions
based on only those observations in increasingly tight bandwidths around the assignment
threshold (Lee and Lemieux 2010). These bandwidths include the optimal bandwidth chosen by
the procedure introduced by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011), which is generally in the range
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of +/- 7 to 9 rating score points. We also present estimates based on triangular kernel weights in
addition to unweighted (i.e., rectangular kernel) results.
5.3 Treatment Assignment
Before turning to our main results, we first discuss the first-stage relationship between the
assignment variable and schools’ participation in Focus School reforms as well as the causal
warrant of our RD designs. We begin by illustrating, both graphically and parametrically, the
relationship between a school’s SGG score and its participation in Focus School reforms. In
Figure 2(a), we show the change in probability of Focus School status for the SGG assignment
variable for the Fuzzy RD sample. All schools with an SGG score in the bottom 10 percent are
classified as Focus Schools while the probability drops approximately 70 percentage points to
the right of the threshold where some schools are Focus Schools because of the secondary
assignment mechanism (i.e., TSD score). In Figure 2(b), the frontier RD changes in probability
of treatment from one to nearly zero, a virtually sharp contrast.23
In Table 2 we show the first-stage RD estimates based on the SGG assignment variable for
the fuzzy and frontier RD. In the sparest specification (i.e., column 1), the RD estimates indicate
that the probability of becoming a Focus School jumps by 75 percentage points at the threshold.
In the subsequent specifications that introduce additional controls (e.g., quadratic splines and
baseline covariates), the point estimate is 68 to 70 percentage points. As expected, in the Frontier
RD application, the “jump” in treatment status at the threshold is nearly 1, reflecting the virtually
sharp first-stage relationship.
These first-stage relationships clearly show a large and discontinuous jump in a school’s
treatment status at the arbitrary threshold set by federal policy. Several other ancillary sources of
information support our maintained assumption that this RD approach results in credible causal
inferences. First, though some schools may feel stigmatized by their Focus status, the multitiered assignment protocol based on pre-existing data (i.e., the 2011-12 K-PREP used to generate
23

Two schools that are classified as Focus Schools but do not fall below the assignment threshold for either criteria are included
in the analytic sample. When we removed these schools from the analytic sample results were similar. After communicating with
KDE officials we were unable to uncover the rationale for Focus School classification.
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SGG scores) makes it quite unlikely that schools would have been able to manipulate their
treatment assignment. A precise manipulation of the SGG score is also infeasible because it
would need to rely on the unduplicated count of students—many of whom could be members of
multiple subgroups—that comprise the gap group. Nonetheless, we conduct robustness checks to
interrogate this assumption empirically.
For example, following McCrary (2008), we implement a density test to see whether the
density of the SGG values jumps discontinuously at the threshold. We fail to reject the null
hypotheses that there is no discontinuity at both thresholds for the fuzzy and frontier samples
(See Appendix Figure 2). Second, we also examine the density of the assignment variable
visually because “heaping” at certain values may fail to be detected by the McCrary density test
(Barreca et al. 2016). In our Appendix Figure 3, we present additional histograms to examine
potential heaping-induced bias by inspecting the distribution of the forcing variable with the
smallest binwidths possible. Although there does appear to be some evidence of heaping at
several assignment variable values, we follow the suggestions of Barreca et al. (2016) for
detecting non-random heaping and confirmed the robustness of our results.24
Third, we also examined the baseline traits of schools listed in Table 1 to assess whether
they are continuous across the assignment variable threshold. In Table 3, we present evidence of
this covariate balance based on a simple two-stage process. In the first stage, we regressed the
outcome of interest, the 2013-14 proficiency rate in math or reading, on all of the baseline
covariates. We then obtain predicted proficiency rates based on these regressions. These
predicted values provide a single value for each school that represent an index of all the baseline
traits that influence outcomes, each weighted by their regression-estimated impacts. We then
estimate and report in Table 3 auxiliary RD equations in which these indices are the dependent
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Specifically, we tested for discontinuous jumps in baseline characteristics at data heaps and did not find
statistically significant differences. Nonetheless, we also examined our results, omitting observations at possible
heaps, and found similar results.
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variables.25 In a valid RD design, our expectation would that these indices of baseline school
traits would be continuous through the threshold that defines treatment status. The results in
Table 3 consistently indicate, for different estimation methods (and different samples) that the
covariates are balanced around the threshold. Overall, these results clearly suggest the
assignment of Kentucky’s schools to Focus School reforms functions as a well-behaved
regression discontinuity.

6. Results
6.1. Main results
We begin by illustrating our main findings graphically in Figure 3. These 4 panels show
the 2013-14 math and reading proficiency rates of gap-group students in schools above and
below the treatment-eligibility threshold and do so both for the full “fuzzy” sample and the
smaller “frontier” sample. These figures consistently indicate that, after the first full year of
implementation, the math and reading proficiency of gap-group students jumped meaningfully at
the threshold that influenced Focus School status. For reading, the jumps in both samples appear
to be of a slightly smaller magnitude compared to the substantial jump for math. We provide
parametric evidence that supports these graphical results in Table 4.
Table 4 reports the estimated reduced-form effect of treatment eligibility on reading and
math proficiency across different specifications (i.e., with and without baseline controls and in
the fuzzy and frontier samples). The top panel of Table 4 shows the math results, which
consistently indicate impacts of roughly 5 percentage points. Because these are intent-to-treat
(ITT) estimates and the fuzzy RD has lower first-stage compliance, the “treatment on the
treated” (TOT) effects implied by these results is somewhat larger in the fuzzy RD specification.
To put estimates of this size in perspective, it should be noted that the math proficiency rate for
gap-group students in schools just above the eligibility threshold is approximately 30 percent.
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The use of these indices attenuates the multiple comparison problems that might plague a plethora of tests based
on each baseline covariate.
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This implies that a 5 percentage-point increase is equivalent to a 17 percent increase relative to
the counterfactual mean.
The bottom panel of Table 4 reports the estimated effect of Focus School eligibility on
reading proficiency rates among gap-group students. These ITT estimates indicate that Focus
School eligibility increased reading proficiency by 2.3 to 3.6 percentage points.26 The implied
TOT estimates (i.e., the estimated effect of being a Focus School) is between 3 and 3.5
percentage points. Reading proficiency rates are approximately 37 percent for gap-group
students in schools just above the assignment threshold. This implies that Focus School reforms
increased reading proficiency by roughly 9 percent relative to the counterfactual mean (i.e.,
3.5/37).
These results indicate that the Focus School reforms led to substantial gains in math and
reading proficiency among the broad gap group. These performance gains are also reflected in
subsequent school exits from Focus School status. The KDE used the 2013-14 achievement
results to identify (and reclassify) Focus Schools that met performance targets (and to designate
new Focus Schools). The treatment effects documented here contributed to the exit of 47 Focus
Schools from this status.
6.2. Robustness checks
We perform a number of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our main results. First,
we examine the robustness of our results to functional-form concerns by reporting the results
from local linear regressions (LLR). In these LLR specifications, we condition on a linear spline
of the assignment variable and the baseline controls but limit the sample to increasingly tight
bandwidths of schools proximate to the eligibility threshold. These bandwidth restrictions
include the optimal bandwidths (i.e. +/-7 to 9 assignment score points) based on the procedure
introduced by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2011). We also report weighted least-squares
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In the fuzzy RD specification that omits baseline controls, this estimate is smaller and statistically insignificant.
However, we examined Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) for this and all other models and found that the AIC
privileges those that condition on both linear splines of the assignment variable and the baseline controls.
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estimates based on a triangular kernel weight that takes higher values for schools close to either
side of the eligibility threshold.
Table 5 reports the key results from these specifications for both math and reading results
as well as for the fuzzy and frontier RD samples. The results across these different bandwidths
and outcomes consistently indicate that the Focus School reforms had qualitatively large and
positive effects on student proficiency in math and reading. In most cases, the estimates based on
these smaller samples also remain statistically significant. However, we note two broad
exceptions. First, in the smaller frontier RD sample, further bandwidth restrictions imply that the
estimated effects on math, though still positive, become smaller and substantially noisier (i.e.,
estimates in column 3). Second, with regard to the reading results, modest bandwidth restrictions
(i.e., within 10 to 20 points of the threshold) imply estimated effects that are smaller and
statistically insignificant. However, further bandwidth restrictions and the kernel-weighted
results imply larger and statistically significant effects on reading proficiency that are actually
somewhat larger than those based on the full samples.
As an additional robustness check, we present several auxiliary RD estimates at “placebo”
RD thresholds (see Appendix Table 4). We artificially move the treatment threshold to various
placebo cut scores to examine whether the positive treatment effects are evident other
unimportant thresholds that hold no policy significance for schools. This additional check allows
us to increase confidence in our main result estimates, which are significant while the placebo
threshold are not. None of the placebo estimates are consistently statistically significant and
further bolster our main results on the effects of Kentucky’s Focus School reforms.
Finally, because our analysis leverages school-level data, we may be concerned that
changes in the composition of students enrolled at schools (or those taking the test) drives the
positive results. To examine this concern, we first examined auxiliary RD specifications in which
the number of students tested (i.e., in the gap group as well as other subgroups) was the
dependent variable. These results consistently indicated no change in the size of these test-taking
populations at the eligibility threshold. We adopted a similar approach to examine whether non-
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random mobility into or out of the school may be a source of bias. First, we estimated a
regression of the 2013-14 performance outcomes on a variety of post-treatment school covariates
reflecting the size and composition of the school (e.g., total enrollment, percent racial/ethnic
enrollment, proportion qualifying for free/reduced priced lunch, limited English proficient and
special education participation). We then took the predicted values from these regressions and
used them as the dependent variables in auxiliary RD specifications. This approach allows us to
examine whether an index of these post-treatment school traits, weighted by their relevance for
student outcomes, differs above and below the eligibility. The key results reported in Table 6
indicate that these post-treatment school traits do not differ significantly around the threshold.
This finding is consistent with the absence of treatment-endogenous student sorting and, by
implication, the causal warrant of the RD results.
6.3. Treatment heterogeneity
Another relevant concern with respect to our main findings is that they may be misleading
if the state’s focus on proficiency encouraged treatment schools to focus their reforms largely on
students close to the proficiency threshold (Lazear 2006). In Table 7, we present evidence that
speaks to this concern by estimating the effects of Focus School eligibility on alternative test
thresholds. Moving a student from the lowest performance level to the apprentice level would
not enable a school to exit Focus School status. Similarly, moving a proficient student to
distinguished status also does not influence Focus School status. Therefore, if schools were
adopting strategic “triage” behavior, we would not expect to see treatment effects at these
margins. However, the RD results in Table 7 indicate that Focus School eligibility generated
positive and, in most cases, statistically significant effects at each performance threshold. One
notable exception is that the estimated effects on distinguished performance in mathematics are
much smaller, possibly reflecting the comparative rarity of performance at this level (i.e., 8.6
percent in this sample).
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Our analysis so far has focused on the test performance of gap-group students, an
amalgamation of traditionally low-performing subgroups and the focal point of these reforms.
However, the effects of these reforms on other groups of students are also of interest. For
example, it may be that these reforms, which had a schoolwide character (e.g., improvement
planning, teacher professional development) had spillover benefits for students outside the gap
group. Alternatively, it may be that schools strategically reallocated instructional effort away
from such “non-gap” students. Although Kentucky does not specifically report on the
performance of non-gap group students, we are able to construct performance level percentages
from available information on the performance of all students and gap group students. We also
have school performance data on subgroups of students qualifying for free/reduced price lunch
and students receiving special education services (i.e., two categories in the gap group). In Table
8, we present RD estimates of the effect of Focus School eligibility on the proficiency rates of
these student groups. The results are consistently positive, though not always statistically
significant. These results suggest that the performance benefits of the Focus School reforms were
broad and, in particular, did not harm (and may have helped) the performance of students outside
the gap group.

7. Conclusion
The conduct and performance of public schools in the U.S. have historically been the concern
of local and state authorities. However, over the last 15 years, the federal government has been
unusually prescriptive in seeking to improve the performance of public schools, particularly with
regard to historically marginalized students. The most recent iteration of these controversial,
federally catalyzed reforms occurred under waivers to NCLB. A signature feature of these
waiver reforms was the push for “differentiated accountability.” In order to address achievement
gaps, these waivers required states to identify schools where targeted subgroups performed
particularly poorly and to support reforms in these designated “Focus Schools.” In this study, we
examined the causal effects of the Focus School reforms in the state of Kentucky. Our RD results
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indicate that these reforms led to substantial improvements in the math and reading performance
of the targeted students (and, possibly, among the students who were not targeted as well). We
also present evidence that comprehensive school planning, including an emphasis on highquality teacher professional development, were mediators of these effects.
The effectiveness of Focus School reforms in Kentucky stands in notable contrast to what we
have learned about similar reform efforts in other states (Hemelt & Jacob 2017, Dee & DizonRoss 2017) where waiver-driven reforms appear to have had no or at best targeted effects. One
ready explanation for the comparative success of Focus School reforms in Kentucky involves the
state-specific context. The state of Kentucky has established a reputation as an enthusiastic and
energetic adopter and implementer of school reforms. The Focus School reforms in Kentucky
appeared to reflect this. The federal requirements for Focus School reforms were vague but
Kentucky articulated detailed and comprehensive reform activities for Focus Schools to
undertake. This engagement and the articulation of “home grown” reforms are both likely to
complement a high-fidelity implementation. Furthermore, the Focus School reforms in Kentucky
also had a fairly unique design feature: the designation of a large, umbrella group of underserved
students for which schools would be held responsible. The use of this larger gap group may have
been instrumental in catalyzing school-wide reforms and avoiding incentives for narrowly
targeted reform efforts. Learning more about how state and local contexts may channel reform
efforts productively is likely to be an increasingly important area of study in education policy.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of RD Samples
Variable
Accountability Characteristics
Focus School 2013-14
SGG Score (centered)
I(SGG Score < 0)

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximim

0.203
12.5
0.092
46.2
38.8

0.403
9.8
0.290
10.0
11.5

0
-19.8
0
17.2
0.0

1.0
55.0
1.0
85.7
78.6

Student Characteristics
Male
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Free/Reduced-Price Lunch
Attendance

0.512
0.827
0.093
0.043
0.012
0.630
0.952

0.035
0.197
0.144
0.061
0.021
0.200
0.012

0
0.073
0
0
0
0.028
0.892

0.619
1.0
0.767
0.739
0.218
1.0
0.979

School Characteristics
Elementary
Middle
Enrollment
Student-teacher ratio
Rural
Urban
Suburban
Reward school
Title I-eligible
Title I Schoolwide Program

0.704
0.296
475
15.5
0.500
0.173
0.134
0.053
0.919
0.799

0.457
0.457
195
2.2
0.500
0.378
0.341
0.225
0.274
0.401

0
0
79
10
0
0
0
0
0
0

1.0
1.0
1,625
21
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

Teacher Characteristics
Teaching experience (years)
Advanced degree (MA, PhD)

11.7
0.513

2.5
0.126

2.3
0.071

20
0.917

Reading Proficiency Rate, Gap Group 2013-14
Math Proficiency Rate, Gap Group 2013-14

SOURCES: Student, school and teacher characteristics are authors' calculations using Kentucky School Report Card
(SRC) and Common Core of Data (CCD), 2011-12.
NOTES: The sample includes 920 schools with an SGG (Student Gap Group) assignment variable. The SGG Score
refers to the baseline assignment variable based on 2011-12 test scores and is centered on the eligibility threshold.
The student-teacher ratio is recoded (winsorized) at the 1st and 99th percentiles.

Table 2. The Effect of Focus School Eligibility on Focus School Status
Dependent Variable: Focus School 2013-14
Independent
Variable:
I(SGG Scorei < 0)
R2
Linear spline
Quadratic spline
Baseline controls

Fuzzy RD
(1)
0.746***
(0.025)

(2)
0.700***
(0.038)

Frontier RD
(3)

0.698***
(0.038)

(4)
0.684***
(0.047)

(5)
0.994***
(0.004)

(6)
0.995***
(0.004)

(7)
0.995***
(0.005)

(8)
0.993***
(0.005)

0.434

0.527

0.437

0.529

0.957

0.957

0.957

0.957

yes
no
no

yes
no
yes

yes
yes
no

yes
yes
yes

yes
no
no

yes
no
yes

yes
yes
no

yes
yes
yes

NOTES: *** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each column contains the first stage, the estimated
effect of the intent to treat on treatment status. See Table 1 for additional details on student, school and teacher controls. Fuzzy RD n=920 ;
Frontier RD n=767.

Table 3. Auxiliary RD Estimates of Baseline Covariate Balance
Dependent variable:

Math achievement index

Reading achievement index

Fuzzy RD

Frontier RD

Fuzzy RD

Frontier RD

Gap Group

0.102
(0.791)

0.493
(0.962)

-1.523
(0.844)

-0.110
(1.052)

Non-gap group

1.909
(1.231)

0.807
(1.621)

0.080
(0.820)

0.461
(1.122)

Free/Reduced-Price Lunch

-0.316
(0.812)

0.085
(0.928)

-1.661
(0.934)

0.319
(1.121)

Special education

-1.218
(1.660)

-0.592
(2.290)

-2.720
(2.042)

-1.395
(2.876)

Sample

NOTES: *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Each cell contains the results of a two-stage regression: (1) in the first stage the 2013-14 outcome for the
relevant subgroup is regressed on all baseline covariates (see Table 1 for a description of covariates) and a
predicted achievement composite is generated. (2) In the second stage the predicted achievement composite is
then regressed on I(SGG Score < 0) and a linear spline for the assignment variable.

Table 4. The Effect of Focus School Eligibility on Gap Group Proficiency Rates by Subject
Math Proficiency Rate
Fuzzy RD

Independent Variable
(1)
I(SGG Scorei < 0)
R2
n

Frontier RD
(2)

4.361***
(1.651)

5.166***
(1.641)

0.343
916

0.425
916

(3)

(4)

4.586**
(1.976)

4.754**
(1.976)

0.304
765

0.382
765

Reading Proficiency Rate
Independent Variable
I(SGG Scorei < 0)
R2
n
Baseline controls

Fuzzy RD
0.373
(1.177)
0.418
918
no

Frontier RD

2.349**
(1.088)

2.518*
(1.371)

3.555***
(1.332)

0.487
918

0.366
765

0.427
765

yes

no

yes

NOTES: *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Each cell contains the result of a separate regression of the effect of I(SGG Scorei < 0) on 2013-14
proficiency rates for gap group students. All models condition on a linear spline of the assignment
variable. Akaike's information criterion (AIC) implied the optimal order of polynomial is linear.

Table 5. The Effect of Focus School Eligibility on Proficiency Rates, by Alternative Bandwidths

Math Proficiency Rate, Gap Group
Fuzzy RD
Bandwidth
Sample

Frontier RD

Reading Proficiency Rate, Gap Group
Fuzzy RD

Frontier RD

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Estimate

n
(Focus)

Estimate

n
(Focus)

Estimate

n
(Focus)

Estimate

n
(Focus)

Full Sample

5.166***
(1.641)

916
(187)

4.754**
(1.976)

765
(49)

2.349**
(1.088)

918
(187)

3.555***
(1.332)

765
(49)

|SGG Scorei| ≤ 20

4.854***
(1.707)

715
(182)

4.132**
(2.066)

570
(49)

1.819
(1.149)

717
(182)

2.823**
(1.418)

570
(49)

|SGG Scorei| ≤ 15

4.135**
(1.730)

574
(175)

3.287
(2.152)

435
(48)

1.513
(1.270)

576
(175)

2.239
(1.617)

435
(48)

|SGG Scorei| ≤ 10

4.512**
(1.984)

387
(142)

3.477
(2.534)

281
(43)

2.443
(1.513)

388
(142)

3.545*
(1.893)

281
(43)

|SGG Scorei| ≤ 7

4.501*
(2.343)

252
(113)

2.380
(2.854)

170
(36)

4.084**
(1.775)

253
(113)

4.962**
(2.176)

170
(36)

Kernel regression

4.727**
(2.222)

368
(141)

3.183
(2.669)

264
(40)

3.917**
(1.585)

369
(138)

5.028***
(1.823)

264
(40)

NOTES: *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each cell contains a regression of 2013-14
reading or math proficiency rates for schools within the specified bandwidth on I(SGG Scorei < 0), a linear spline of the
assignment variable and baseline covariates. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 contain the number of schools in the specified bandwidth and
the number of treatment schools below the bandwidth total in parentheses. See Table 1 for a description of controls.

Table 6. Auxiliary RD Estimates of Post-treatment Covariate Balance
Fuzzy RD

Frontier RD

Math achievement index

0.269
(0.456)

0.0328
(0.624)

Reading achievement index

0.344
(0.414)

0.138
(0.478)

NOTES: *** p < .001 ** p < .01 * p < .05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each cell contains
the results of a two-stage regression: (1) in the first stage the 2013-14 test score for the gap subgroup is
regressed on all post-treatment school covariates (i.e. percent racial/ethnic enrollment, total enrollment,
attendance, student-teacher ratio, percent free/reduced lunch, percent ELL, percent special education
and number of tested students in a subgroup) and a predicted composite is generated. (2) In the second
stage the predicted post-treatment composite is regressed on I(SGG Score < 0) and a linear spline for
the assignment variable and baseline covariates (See Table 1 for a description of covariates).

Table 7. The Effect of Focus School Eligibilty on Gap Group Proficiency Levels
Fuzzy RD

Math
Frontier RD

Estimate

Estimate

Mean

Apprentice and above

2.828*
(1.591)

2.392
(1.841)

78.5

Proficient and above

5.166***
(1.641)

4.754**
(1.976)

38.8

Distinguished and above

0.993
(0.678)

0.430
(0.938)

8.6

916

765

Performance Level

N

Fuzzy RD

Reading
Frontier RD

Estimate

Estimate

Mean

Apprentice and above

2.393*
(1.246)

3.484**
(1.522)

74.3

Proficient and above

2.349**
(1.088)

3.555***
(1.332)

46.2

Distinguished and above

1.780**
(0.719)

2.172**
(0.981)

12.5

918

765

N

NOTES: *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Each cell contains a separate regression of the effect of I(SGG Scorei < 0) on 2013-14
proficiency levels for gap group students. All models contain a linear spline for the assignment
variable and controls from the preferred specification in Table 4. The lowest proficiency level
is novice followed by apprentice, proficienct and distinguished.

Table 8. The Effect of Focus School Eligibility on Subgroup Proficiency Rates
Math Proficiency Rate
Fuzzy RD

n

5.166***
(1.641)

916

4.754**
(1.976)

765

2.349**
(1.088)

918

3.555*** 765
(1.332)

Free/ReducedPrice Lunch

4.077**
(1.614)

905

3.128
(2.081)

754

2.003*
(1.186)

904

3.033*
(1.441)

752

Special
education

6.378**
(2.578)

854

5.294
(3.783)

707

2.613
(2.422)

852

4.293
(3.309)

706

Non-gap

3.365
(3.167)

914

8.531**
(4.183)

764

1.528
(2.941)

916

7.272*
(3.272)

764

Sample
Subgroup
Gap Group

Frontier RD

Reading Proficiency Rate
n

Fuzzy RD

n

Frontier RD

n

NOTES: *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each cell contains the
result of a separate regression of I(SGG Scorei < 0) on proficiency rates for different subgroups. All models
condition on a linear spline of the assignment variable and the full set of controls from the preferred
specification in Table 4.

Table A1. The Effect of Focus School Status on Gap Group Proficiency Rates, by Alternative Samples
Math Proficiency Rate, Gap Group
Actual Sample (Excluding
districts with closures)

All Schools with
Results

Last Observation Carry
Forward (LOCF)

Estimate
(1)
5.166***
(1.641)

n
(2)
916

Estimate
(3)
5.286***
(1.570)

n
(4)
1012

Estimate
(5)
5.141***
(1.547)

n
(6)
1054

Frontier RD 2013-14

4.754**
(1.976)

765

5.001***
(1.864)

853

4.701**
(1.827)

890

Fuzzy RD 2014-15

1.960
(1.539)

849

3.338**
(1.522)

994

3.713**
(1.539)

1054

Frontier RD 2014-15

0.460
(1.599)

701

3.115*
(1.731)

834

3.493*
(1.795)

890

Estimate

n

Fuzzy RD 2013-14

2.349**
(1.088)

918

3.227***
(1.047)

1013

3.121***
(1.047)

1054

Frontier RD 2013-14

3.555***
(1.332)

765

4.573***
(1.258)

852

4.283***
(1.275)

890

Fuzzy RD 2014-15

1.154
(1.284)

852

2.591**
(1.269)

997

2.462*
(1.268)

1054

Frontier RD 2014-15

0.495
(1.663)

703

2.915*
(1.658)

836

2.559
(1.656)

890

Sample:
Fuzzy RD 2013-14

Reading Proficiency Rate, Gap Group
Estimate
n
Estimate

n

NOTES: *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Each cell contains a separate regression of the effect of I(SGG Scorei < 0) on proficiency rates for gap group
students. All models contain a linear spline for the assignment variable and controls from the preferred specification
in Table 4. See Table 1 for a description of controls. Column (1) contains the preferred estimate from the main
results in Table 4 based on a the sample that excludes all districts with any school closures. Column 3 contains
estimates that include any school with outcomes in a particular year. Column 5 contains estimates for all schools
that received an assignment score at baseline and the last observed proficiency rate is imputed for schools with a
missing outcome.

Table A2. Auxiliary RD Estimates of Focus School Eligibility on Teacher Satisfaction Survey
Fuzzy RD
Full Sample
PD Quality

|SGG Scorei| ≤ 20

|SGG Scorei| ≤ 10

0.0811
(0.0497)

0.0793
(0.0544)

0.102**
(0.0491)

0.0825
(0.0545)

0.0987
(0.0603)

0.117**
(0.0544)

0.0759
(0.0515)

0.0728
(0.0563)

0.0893*
(0.0515)

PD is Data Driven

0.0224
(0.0560)

0.0232
(0.0611)

0.0601
(0.0550)

PD Aligned with School Improvement Plan

0.0778
(0.0474)

0.0792
(0.0521)

0.0954**
(0.0462)

PD Deepens Content Knowledge

0.0612
(0.0531)

0.0456
(0.0580)

0.0713
(0.0525)

PD Follow up Provided

0.124**
(0.0600)

0.132**
(0.0671)

0.149**
(0.0606)

PD Provides Collaboration Opportunities

0.104*
(0.0562)

0.0893
(0.0612)

0.114**
(0.0557)

PD is Evaluated and Results Communicated

0.0758
(0.0637)

0.0776
(0.0684)

0.113*
(0.0637)

PD Teaches Strategies to Meet Student Needs

0.104**
(0.0477)

0.0964*
(0.0526)

0.116**
(0.0479)

PD Helps Teachers Improve Student Learning

0.0903**
(0.0445)

0.0768
(0.0495)

0.0998**
(0.0444)

Instructional Supports

0.0600
(0.0455)

0.0474
(0.0533)

0.0694
(0.0492)

Had Common Core PD

-0.00223
(0.0296)

-0.0198
(0.0330)

-0.0306
(0.0308)

Had Closing Achievement Gap PD

0.0347
(0.0310)

0.0196
(0.0345)

0.0364
(0.0315)

Had Special Education PD

0.0349
(0.0233)

0.0345
(0.0272)

0.0310
(0.0251)

n

909

710

382

Linear spline
Quadratic spline
Baseline controls

yes
yes
yes

yes
no
yes

yes
no
yes

Sufficient Resources for PD
I(SGG Score < 0)
Appropriate Time for PD

NOTES: *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each cell contains a separate auxiliary RD regression of I(SGG
Scorei <0) on post-treatment covariates from the 2015 TELL Kentucky Teacher Survey. Professional Development (PD) Quality consists of a
composite of 10 four-point likert items related to PD quality (e.g. resources, feedback, data usage, follow-up, collaboration etc.).

Table A3. First Stage and Reduced-Form Estimates by Subgroup and Proficiency Level, TSD Threshold
Dependent Variable:
Focus School 2013-14
Fuzzy RD
Independent Variable:
I(TSD Scorei < 0)

0.673***
(0.054)
R2
n

Basline controls

Frontier RD
0.662***
(0.054)

0.751***
(0.061)

0.744***
(0.061)

0.638
899

0.675
899

0.841
819

0.846
819

no

yes

no

yes

Dependent Variable: 2014 Math Proficiency Rate
Gap Group
Special Education
Fuzzy RD
Frontier RD
Fuzzy RD
Frontier RD

Performance Level
Apprentice and above

1.516
(1.075)

1.680
(1.134)

-0.256
(2.172)

-0.193
(2.393)

Proficient and above

1.864
(1.232)

1.912
(1.329)

1.444
(1.818)

0.808
(1.987)

Distinguished and above

0.635
(0.529)

0.765
(0.551)

1.306
(0.862)

1.440
(0.962)

895

816

843

769

n

Dependent Variable: 2014 Reading Proficiency Rate
Gap Group
Special Education
Fuzzy RD
Frontier RD
Fuzzy RD
Frontier RD
Apprentice and above

1.648*
(0.988)

2.234**
(1.013)

1.252
(1.999)

1.887
(2.212)

Proficient and above

2.271**
(0.989)

2.922***
(1.008)

-0.614
(1.662)

-0.467
(1.817)

Distinguished and above

1.057*
(0.544)

1.388**
(0.559)

1.869**
(0.933)

2.108**
(1.026)

897

818

841

768

n

NOTES: *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models contain a linear spline for
the assignment variable and the full set of controls from the preferred model in Table 4 (See Table 1 for a description
of the controls).

Table A4. Placebo RD Estimates
Math Proficiency Rate
Fuzzy RD
Placebo RD: I(SGG Scorei ≤ -8)
Placebo RD: I(SGG Scorei ≤ -4)
Actual RD: I(SGG Scorei < 0)
Placebo RD: I(SGG Scorei ≤ +4)
Placebo RD: I(SGG Scorei ≤ +8)
Placebo RD: I(SGG Scorei ≤ +12)
Placebo RD: I(SGG Scorei ≤ +16)
N

2.983
(2.621)
2.561
(2.347)
5.166***
(1.641)
1.514
(1.177)
0.655
(0.983)
-0.585
(0.961)
0.276
(1.059)
916

Frontier RD

Reading Proficiency Rate
Fuzzy RD

Frontier RD

0.332
(3.694)
3.173
(2.837)
4.754**
(1.976)
2.272
(1.433)
1.467
(1.217)
-0.506
(1.114)
0.490
(1.144)

2.322
(2.609)
-0.825
(2.145)
2.349**
(1.088)
0.114
-0.898
1.488
(0.809)
1.091
(0.813)
0.703
(0.883)

-0.223
(3.306)
0.046
(3.380)
3.555***
(1.332)
0.674
(1.112)
1.991*
(0.968)
1.070
(0.928)
0.243
(0.953)

765

918

765

NOTES: *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each cell contains an
estimate of the focus school classification discontinuity for different values of the assignment variable. All
models contain a linear spline of the assignment variable and baseline covariates. See Table 1 for a description
of controls.

Figure 1. Focus School assignment by forcing variables
NOTES: Graph illustrates Focus School assignment along both forcing variable dimensions, Student Gap
Group (SGG) and Third Standard Deviation (TSD) rating scores, on the x and y-axis respectively. Schools with
rating scores less than zero on either dimension meet the Focus School classification criteria .

(a) Fuzzy RD

(b) Frontier RD

Figure 2. Focus School Status by Student Gap Group Score, 2013-14
NOTES: Graphs of focus school treatment status by the SGG assignment variables for
Fuzzy and Frontier RD samples. Bin width 0.5, full sample.

(a) 2013-14 Math Proficiency Residualized, Gap Group, Fuzzy RD

(b) 2013-14 Math Proficiency Residualized, Gap Group, Frontier RD

(c) 2013-14 Reading Proficiency Residualized, Gap Group, Fuzzy RD

(d) 2014 Reading Proficiency Residualized, Gap Group, Frontier RD

Figure 3. Gap Group Proficiency Rates, by RD Sample, 2013-14
NOTES: Graphs of 2014 residualized proficiency rate for math and reading by the SGG assignment variable for Fuzzy and Frontier RD samples. Bin width 1.5,
bandwidth +/-15, Markers weighted by number of schools in bin width.
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Appendix Figure 1. School closure or grade reconstitution 2013-15
NOTES: Graphs of school closure or grade reconstitution during the treatment period (2013-15)
by the SGG assignment variable (n=1054). Bin width 2.5, full sample. Markers weighted by
number of schools in bin width. Parametric point estimate -0.0608 (0.0173).
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(a) Density of SGG Assignment Variable, Fuzzy RD
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(b) Density of SGG Assignment Variable, Frontier RD

Appendix Figure 2. Density of Assignment Variable
NOTES: Assignment variable centered at zero. McCrary density test discontinuity
estimates: A(1) -0.181 (.276); and A(2) 0.019 (.344). Standard error in parentheses.

(a) SGG Histogram, Fuzzy RD

(b) SGG Histogram, Frontier RD

(c) SGG Histogram +/- 10, Fuzzy RD

(d) SGG Histogram +/- 10, Frontier RD

Appendix Figure 3. Histogram of Forcing Variable, by RD Sample
NOTES: Graphs contain histograms of the assignment variables for Focus School status, with the assignment variable centered at zero. Bin width 0.1, figures (1) and (2)
includes the full sample, figures (3) and (4) includes bandwidth of approximately +/- 1 SD. See Table 1 for exact values.

